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ARTICLE
CHARITABLE NONPROFITS’ USE OF
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS:
HAVING THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS
LINDSEY D. BLANCHARD 

INTRODUCTION
For years, individuals have been challenging the noncompetition
agreements they entered into with their employers on the basis that the
agreements violate public policy.
However, in a competitive
marketplace—where every person is out for him or herself and the goal
is to maximize profits—courts and legislatures in many jurisdictions are
reluctant to invalidate otherwise reasonable noncompetition agreements.
After all, companies should have the right to expect that freelynegotiated contract provisions will be enforced.
But what if the noncompetition agreement is entered into between
an individual and a nonprofit organization? Should the nonprofit
organization have the same right of expectation? For the most part, the
courts and legislatures seem to think so. And, perhaps they are right, at
least when it comes to the general class of nonprofits and to nonprofits
that are protecting their interests against for-profit entities. As for
charitable—or § 501(c)(3)—nonprofits that are attempting to protect
their interests against other charitable nonprofits, however, the decisionmaking bodies should reconsider their position.
Unlike traditional for-profit entities, whose main goal is profit
maximization, charitable nonprofits are organized and operated to benefit
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some greater good. As a result, charitable nonprofits receive donations
from philanthropic individuals and corporations, as well as various tax
breaks from the government, which are unavailable to for-profit entities.
At the same time, charitable nonprofits exploit many of the same tools
that for-profit firms utilize to maximize profits, including
noncompetition agreements. Thus, charitable nonprofits are able to
benefit from an anti-competition, profit-maximizing tool while also
reaping the rewards of their tax-exempt status. In short, charitable
nonprofits wrongly enjoy the best of both the for-profit and nonprofit
worlds.
Part II of this Article discusses charitable nonprofits, focusing on
their unique philanthropic missions and the tax benefits conferred on
them by the federal and state governments. Part III provides a general
overview of employee noncompetition agreements.
Part IV
demonstrates that charitable nonprofits’ use of noncompetition
agreements is contrary to their missions and tax-exempt statuses, as well
as to the public interest, because the noncompetition agreements restrict
individuals’ abilities to serve society. Moreover, alternative and less
intrusive means of protecting an employer’s interests exist. Finally, Part
IV proposes that Congress should adopt a law rendering unenforceable
any language in a noncompetition agreement that would prevent an
individual from leaving the employment of one charitable nonprofit for
employment at another. 1
1

Taking this argument a step further to state that charitable nonprofits should not be
allowed to use noncompetition agreements at all—whether dealing with other charitable nonprofits
or for-profit entities—while not the topic of this Article, also may be worth considering. The
charitable nonprofits’ foray into the for-profit world of competition has some people concerned
about the organizations’ ability to maintain their mission focus. CRISTIANA CICORIA, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS FACING COMPETITION: THE APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN AND
GERMAN COMPETITION LAW TO NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENTITIES 34 (2006) (noting that competition with
for-profit firms can “lead nonprofits to adopt business-like practices, and to lose the focus on
noncommercial/altruistic missions”); W. HARRISON WELLFORD & JANNE G. GALLAGHER, UNFAIR
COMPETITION? THE CHALLENGE TO TAX EXEMPTION ix (1988) (stating that some nonprofits have
“los[t] sight of the fact that they are, in fact, not for profit”). For example, competition with forprofit firms can lead to commercialization.
See Howard P. Tuckman, Competition,
Commercialization, and the Evolution of Nonprofit Organizational Structures, 17 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 175, 177 (1998). In other words, in order to stay in business, a charitable
nonprofit may decide to produce some goods or services for the sole purpose of generating a profit.
Id. at 177, 186. Over time, this increase in commercial activity likely will draw the organization’s
attention away from its chief activities. See id. at 190. Thus, “[t]he challenge for public policy is to
insure that . . . the pressures toward commercialization[] do not diminish the unique charitable role
of the nonprofit sector.” Id. at 176; see also Burton A. Weisbrod, Guest Editor’s Introduction: The
Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 165, 173 (1998) (“At present,
public policy is permissive in its regulations as they affect nonprofits’ access to commercial markets.
But the social disadvantages of having nonprofits act increasingly like private firms are
considerable.”). When charitable nonprofits lose sight of their mission focus, they should no longer
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

The nonprofit sector is made up of a variety of players, but as of
1991, almost half of all nonprofits were charitable nonprofits. 2 As of
2000, that percentage had risen to two-thirds. 3 The term “charitable
nonprofits” refers to those entities which satisfy the conditions set forth
in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 4 Section 501(c)(3) entities
are:
[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no
part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private

be allowed to reap the tax benefits of their nonprofit status. In fact, the Internal Revenue Service and
state tax authorities have begun to more closely monitor charitable nonprofits’ charitable activities.
James R. Hines Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1179, 1182 (2010).
2
WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., THE CHARITABLE NONPROFITS: AN ANALYSIS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND CHARACTERISTICS 5 & fig.1.1 (1994) (showing that, according to
the IRS Annual Report dated September 1991, there were 516,554 § 501(c)(3) nonprofits and
538,991 non-§ 501(c)(3) nonprofits). The percentage was roughly the same five years later. See
Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Assocations, and Nonprofit
Organizations in the United States, 1600–2000, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, 32, 52 tbl.2.1 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (citing P.D.
HALL AND C.B. BURKE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: MILLENNIAL EDITION
(2006)) (showing that, as of 1996, there were 1,188,510 nonprofits, 573,265 of which were
charitable nonprofits).
3
Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle, Scope and Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector,
in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 66, 68 & tbl.3.2. In 2000,
there were 1,355,894 registered tax-exempt entities in the United States, 819,008 of which were
charitable organizations. Id. at 68 tbl.3.1. That number does not include religious congregations,
which are not required to register. Id. at 68. As of the 2008 tax year, there were 1,186,915 active
charitable nonprofit organizations recognized by the Internal Revenue Service. Paul Arnsberger &
Mike Graham, Charities, Fraternal Beneficiary Societies, and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations,
2008, STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 1, 2 (2011), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11eofallbulteorg.pdf.
4
BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (stating that § 501(c)(3) organizations are referred to as
“‘charitable’ nonprofits”); Boris & Steuerle, supra note 3, at 67 (referring to § 501(c)(3)
organizations as “charitable organizations” or “‘public benefit’ organizations”); John Simon et al.,
The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 267, 268 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983)) (“The shorthand ‘charitable’ or ‘charity’ is used for these groups, even though it is only one
of several adjectives used in §501(c)(3), partly because ‘charitable’ is the residual category used to
classify these groups when they do not fit under any of the other adjectives, and partly because the
Supreme Court has held that all §501(c)(3) groups must conform to certain fundamental commonlaw charitable criteria.”).
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shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation . . . , and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office. 5

Thus, to qualify for charitable nonprofit status, an entity must be
organized and operated for purposes that benefit the greater good (i.e., it
must have a charitable mission), 6 must not distribute profits to those in

5

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2014). Section 501(c)(3) organizations were originally limited to
religious, educational, charitable, and scientific organizations. BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at
xxxiii. Those designations comport with early definitions of charity. See id. at xxx (“St. Thomas
Aquinas classified the spiritual acts of charity as to counsel, to sustain, to teach, to console, to save,
to pardon, and to pray; the corporal acts of charity as to clothe, to give drink to, to feed, to free from
prison, to shelter, to assist in sickness, and to bury.”). Over the years, Congress added organizations
that seek to prevent cruelty to children or animals (1918), organizations that serve literary purposes
(1921), and organizations that test for public safety (1954). Id. at xxxiii. According to one scholar,
“[t]hese developments . . . remain consistent with what is probably the best general definition of the
term charity: activity that tends toward human betterment.” Id. Section 501(c)(3) organizations
have been described by one prominent scholar as “the innermost circle of exempt organizations.”
Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good
Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807, 818 (1988-89) [hereinafter Hansmann, Evolving Law]. For a
discussion of the history of philanthropic activity and the development of nonprofit organizations in
the United States, see Kevin C. Robbins, The Nonprofit Sector in Historical Perspective: Traditions
of Philanthropy in the West, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
13, 13–31; Hall, supra note 2, at 32–65.
6
See, e.g., Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective,
STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 105, 110 (2008), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf (“In order to qualify
for tax-exempt status, an organization must show that its purpose serves the public good, as opposed
to a private interest.”); BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at xxxii–xxxiii (“[I]t is necessary to distinguish
between ‘charitable’ activities, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, ‘noncharitable’ activities
defined by the Internal Revenue Code as ‘nonprofit’ and therefore tax-exempt. The latter are of
many sorts, with varied purposes that are related to mutuality, self-help, and cooperation or to
activities which for special political reasons have been deemed to deserve nonprofit status. . . . [The
former are those that engage in] activity that tends toward human betterment.”); Hines Jr. et al.,
supra note 1, at 1181 (stating that § 501(c)(3) “nonprofits must be both organized and operated for
specified charitable purposes”); see also id. at 1185 (noting that “state law generally requires
nonprofits to identify a charitable mission in their organizing documents and operate in furtherance
of that mission”); Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About Securities SelfRegulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 139
(2011) (citing Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 133
(2006)) (stating that charitable nonprofits “are established to serve the public interest”); Richard
Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 1, 2 (“In the legal sense, charitable organizations include those
organizations that help the needy but also include churches, schools, hospitals, and social service
organizations, which generally benefit an indefinite class of individuals.”). If an entity is not
organized and operated exclusively for one or more purposes as listed in § 501(c)(3), it will not be
considered exempt. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (West 2012). To satisfy the organizational test,
the entity’s articles of organization must: (a) [l]imit the purposes of such organization to one or more
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control of the entity, 7 and must refrain from participating in politics. 8 In
addition, common law provides that a charitable organization may not
act contrary to established public policy. 9 Satisfaction of these criteria
leads to significant tax benefits under federal and state law, 10 including
income and property tax exemptions for the organization and its donors’
ability to deduct their gifts from their taxable income.
Perhaps the most important of the above-mentioned attributes is the
charitable nonprofit’s pursuit of a philanthropic mission. Without that
feature, an entity foregoes some of the tax benefits accorded charitable
nonprofits, most notably the ability to receive tax-deductible gifts. 11
Thus, whether an organization adopts a charitable mission in order to
gain favorable tax status, or favorable tax status is a bonus for an

exempt purposes; and (b) . . . not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise than as
an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or
more exempt purposes.” Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i). An entity will satisfy the operational test,
“only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes
specified in section 501(c)(3).” Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
7
See, e.g., BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (citing Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 835–901 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise] (“The most important generic characteristic of a nonprofit organization is its adherence
to what Henry Hansmann has called the ‘nondistribution constraint,’ which prohibits the distribution
of profits or residual earnings to individuals who control the entity.”); Simon et al., supra note 4, at
268 (“With some minor exceptions, . . .what all of the inhabitants of th[e nonprofit] sector have in
common is, first, the ‘nondistribution constraint’: they are entitled to make profits but are forbidden
to distribute these profits to any person or entity (other than another nonprofit organization)—they
have, in conventional terms, no ‘owners’ . . . .”); Richard Steinberg, Economic Theories of Nonprofit
Organizations, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 117, 118
(“A nonprofit organization is one precluded from distributing, in financial form, its surplus resources
to those in control of the organization. By this definition, nonprofit organizations can earn and retain
financial surplus (“profits”) provided they do not pay dividend checks or their equivalent to the
board of directors or top managers.”); Hines Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 1180 (citing Steinberg &
Powell, supra note 6, at 1 (“[N]onprofit organizations may have members and other stakeholders,
but may not distribute profits to any owner. This means that directors and managers may dictate the
use of nonprofit assets, but may not personally profit from those assets.”).
8
JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 21 (1995)
(citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)).
9
Id.; Rebecca S. Rudnick, State and Local Taxes on Nonprofit Organizations, 22 CAP. U. L.
REV. 321, 330 (1993) (citing Trevor A. Brown, Religious Nonprofits and the Commercial Manner
Test, 99 YALE L.J. 1631, 1632 (1990)). For example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the IRS’s
revocation of exempt status for racially discriminatory schools because the schools were violating
clearly-established public policy. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 21 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)).
10
“[S]tates generally follow the federal scheme . . . .Thus state common law generally adopts
the view that an entity is not charitable if it engages in private inurement, excess political activity, or
violates established public policy.” COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 22 (citations omitted).
11
BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at xxxii; see id. at 5 (stating that “‘noncharitable’ nonprofits”
provide goods and services that benefit a specific membership and are, therefore ineligible for some
of the favorable tax treatment afforded charitable organizations).
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organization already dedicated to a charitable mission, it is the mission
that ultimately defines the organization.
A.

THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE CHARITABLE NONPROFIT’S MISSION

In general terms, “mission” means “a strongly felt aim, ambition, or
calling.” 12 In the business context, a “mission” defines the basic reason
for an organization’s existence. 13 Not only does it describe the
organization’s core competencies and goals, but it also identifies the
company’s guiding principles and values. 14 In other words, a mission
creates a public image and distinguishes the company from its peers. 15
The presence of a mission is an important tool for organizations because
it generates employee unity and commitment 16 and provides a foundation
for strategic planning. 17 In fact, entities often put their mission in writing
as a formal “mission statement” (sometimes called a “vision statement” 18
or “statement of purpose” 19 ).
Both nonprofit and for-profit entities utilize mission statements.
Thus, the devotion to a mission is not what distinguishes a charitable
12

Mission: definition of mission in Oxford Dictionary (American English) (US), OXFORD
DICTIONARIES , http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mission?region=us&q =mission (last visited
May 1, 2014).
13
See Gordon T. Butler, The Law School Mission Statement: A Survival Guide for the
Twenty-first Century, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 240, 240 (2000) (A “mission” is the “fundamental reason
for an organization’s existence.”); John A. Pearce II & Fred David, Corporate Mission Statements:
The Bottom Line, THE ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, 109, 109 (May 1987) (“[A mission statement]
specifies the fundamental reason why an organization exists.”).
14
See Jerome Organ, Missing Missions: Further Reflections on Institutional Pluralism (or its
Absence), 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 159 (2010) (stating that “a mission identifies a set of purposes
and values that guide an organization and the members of the organization in making decisions and
directing resources”); STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE 106 (1989)
(“[A] personal mission statement [is a] philosophy or creed. It focuses on what you want to be
(character) and to do (contributions and achievements) and on the values or principles upon which
being and doing are based.”) (emphasis in original); Pearce & David, supra note 13, at 109
(describing the “eight key components of mission statements” as including “[t]he identification of
principal products/services,” “[t]he expression of commitment to survival, growth, and profitability,”
and “[t]he specification of key elements in the company philosophy”).
15
Charles N. Toftoy & Joydeep Chatterjee, Mission Statements and the Small Business, BUS.
STRATEGY REV., Autumn 2004, at 41, 42; Butler, supra note 13, at 240; Organ, supra note 14, at
159.
16
See COVEY, supra note 14, at 143 (“An organizational mission statement—one that truly
reflects the deep shared vision and values of everyone within that organization—creates a great unity
and tremendous commitment. It creates in people’s hearts and minds a frame of reference, a set of
criteria or guidelines, by which they will govern themselves.”); Toftoy & Chatterjee, supra note 15,
at 43.
17
See Pearce & David, supra note 13, at 109; Toftoy & Chatterjee, supra note 15, at 43.
18
Butler, supra note 13, at 240.
19
Pearce & David, supra note 13, at 109.
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nonprofit’s persona from its for-profit counterparts; rather, it is the nature
of the charitable nonprofit’s mission that sets it apart. 20 Compare, for
example, the mission statements for PepsiCo and Target Corporation
(two for-profit entities) with those of the American Red Cross, Mayo
Clinic, and Catholic Charities USA (three charitable nonprofit
organizations):
PepsiCo
Our mission is to be the world’s premier consumer products company
focused on convenient foods and beverages. We seek to produce
financial rewards to investors as we provide opportunities for growth
and enrichment to our employees, our business partners and the
communities in which we operate. And in everything we do, we strive
for honesty, fairness and integrity. 21
Target
Our mission is to make Target your preferred shopping destination in
all channels by delivering outstanding value, continuous innovation
and exceptional guest experiences by consistently fulfilling our Expect
More. Pay Less.® brand promise. 22
American Red Cross
The American Red Cross, a humanitarian organization led by
volunteers and guided by its Congressional Charter and the
Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, will provide relief to victims of disaster and help
people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. 23

20

See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 1, at 172–73 (“In the case of [nonprofit] hospitals, the
social mission is to care for the indigent, to undertake research that generates widespread knowledge,
and to provide such community-benefit services as education about drugs and maternal nutrition—
not simply to provide services for paying customers. In the case of [nonprofit] universities, the
social mission is the provision of basic research, education of the poor, and dissemination of
information.”).
21
Our Mission and Values, PEPSICO, www.pepsico.com/Purpose/Our-Mission-and-Values
(last visited May 8, 2014).
22
Mission & Values, TARGET, https://corporate.target.com/about/mission-values (last visited
May 8, 2014).
23
Mission, Vision, and Fundamental Principles, AMERICAN RED CROSS,
www.redcross.org/about-us/mission (last visited May 8, 2014).
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Mayo Clinic
To inspire hope and contribute to health and well-being by providing
the best care to every patient through integrated clinical practice,
education and research. 24
Catholic Charities USA
The mission of Catholic Charities is to provide service to people in
need, to advocate for justice in social structures, and to call the entire
church and other people of good will to do the same. 25

While the for-profit entities’ mission statements focus on producing topnotch consumer products, providing premium customer service, and
maximizing profitability, the charitable nonprofits’ mission statements
focus on bettering the welfare of society in some particular way. 26 Thus,
the charitable nonprofits’ mission statements comport with § 501(c)(3)
and broadcast the organizations’ philanthropic purposes to society at
large.
B.

FAVORABLE TAX TREATMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS PROVIDED TO
CHARITABLE NONPROFITS

The public good-oriented missions pursued by charitable nonprofits
play a major role in the nonprofits’ survival, providing benefits beyond
those provided to for-profit organizations with profit-oriented mission
statements. 27 In addition to reaping the managerial benefits discussed
above, charitable nonprofits’ mission statements also attract donors and
draw subsidies from private foundations and government agencies. 28

24

Mayo
Clinic
Mission
and
Values,
MAYO
CLINIC,
www.mayoclinic.org/about/missionvalues.html (last visited May 8, 2014).
25
About Us, CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, http://catholiccharitiesusa.org/about-us/ (last visited
May 8, 2014).
26
Of course, for-profits’ and nonprofits’ mission statements are not always written in such
different terms. For example, Microsoft’s mission is to “help people and businesses throughout the
world
realize
their
full
potential.”
About
Us,
MICROSOFT,
www.microsoft.com/enable/microsoft/mission.aspx (last visited May 8, 2014). That statement
contains no specific references to the products and services provided by Microsoft, the superior
customer service Microsoft intends to provide, or Microsoft’s profit goals. Thus, while Microsoft is
one of the biggest for-profit companies in the world, its mission statement sounds like it could have
been written for a nonprofit organization.
27
See Debra C. Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission: Constancy,
Responsiveness, or Deflection?, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note
2, at 591, 591 (citing SHARON OSTER, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
(1995)) (“[M]ission plays a much larger role in nonprofits than in proprietary enterprises.”).
28
See, e.g., Eleanor Brown & Al Slivinski, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in THE
NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 140, 140–41; Organ, supra note 14,
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Charitable nonprofits are even able to save money when purchasing other
nonprofit entities that share their mission. 29 Moreover, in exchange for
the ability to pursue a worthy cause, employees often are willing to work
for lower wages (or to forego wages altogether as volunteers) than they
would receive in a comparable position at a for-profit enterprise. 30
The most well-known benefit enjoyed by charitable nonprofits is
their favorable tax treatment by both the federal and state governments. 31
Charitable nonprofits have been exempt from federal income taxation
since 1894, and they have been exempt from state and local property
taxation even longer. 32 In addition, charitable nonprofits often are
relieved from paying state income and sales taxes, 33 are permitted to
at 159–60 (donors); Robbins, supra note 5, at 13 (“Modern charitable nonprofit organizations owe
their inception and continued support to the public-spirited generosity of philanthropists who feel
that contributions to the commonwealth are spiritual or moral imperatives.”).
29
Paul Gertler & Jennifer Kuan, Does It Matter Who Your Buyer Is? The Role of Nonprofit
Mission in the Market for Corporate Control of Hospitals, 52 J.L. & ECON. 295, 296–97, 304 (2009)
(discussing a study of 135 sales of hospitals that occurred between 1999 and 2000 and concluding
that a nonprofit buyer will pay less to a nonprofit seller than would a for-profit buyer because of the
nonprofit buyer’s mission).
30
Brown & Slivinski, supra note 28, at 141 (stating that “otherwise identical workers may be
willing to work in a nonprofit at a lower wage than they would in a similar for-profit firm” because
they care about the nonprofit’s mission); see Minkoff & Powell, supra note 27, at 591 (stating that a
nonprofit’s “goals provide workers and donors with the satisfaction that their values are being put
into action”). But see Hines Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 1199 (citing Brown & Slivinski, supra note
28, at 142) (stating that “the overall wage differential between nonprofits and for-profits is zero”);
Laura Leete, Work in the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 159, 166 (citing Anne E. Preston, The Market for Human Resources: Comparing the
Professional Career Paths in the Public, Private, Nonprofit Sector, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
IN A MARKET ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING NEW ROLES, ISSUES AND TRENDS (David C. Hammack
and Dennis R. Young, eds. 1993)) (discussing a study which found that “sectoral exit was higher for
[engineers and scientists] working in the nonprofit sector, where they were paid considerably less,”
thereby supporting “the idea that young scientists and engineers use the nonprofit sector as a training
ground before they go on to more lucrative careers in the for-profit sector”).
31
Countless sources discuss the tax treatment accorded charitable nonprofit organizations.
Because this Article merely offers a brief overview of the subject, only a handful of the available
sources are cited.
32
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 3 (citing The Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28
Stat. 556 (1894); Carroll H. Sierk, State Tax Exemptions of Non-Profit Organizations, 19 CLEVE. ST.
L. REV. 281, 282 (1970)). See Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 5, at 810 (discussing the history
of fiscal and regulatory law for nonprofits between 1850 and 1950). The state statutes and
constitutional provisions typically provide the exemptions to religious, educational, and charitable
organizations in a manner similar to § 501(c)(3). Id. at 20. For a comprehensive discussion of those
exemptions, see William R. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations: A Perspective, 53 TEMPLE L. Q. 291, 292 (1980); WELLFORD & GALLAGHER, supra
note 1, at app. A (providing a 50-state survey of laws governing charitable property tax exemptions).
33
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 3, 20 (citing Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The
Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 307, 323 n.53 (1991); Janne G. Gallagher, Sales Tax Exemptions for Charitable,
Educational, and Religious Nonprofit Organizations, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 429 (1993)).
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issue tax-exempt bonds, 34 are exempt from the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act and the federal gambling tax, 35 and can receive tax-deductible
donations from their supporters. 36
While the charitable tax exemption is entrenched in federal law,
there is no commonly-accepted explanation for its existence. 37
Historically, tax-based theories were used to justify the exemption. 38
Under such theories, “exemption exists for entities that simply do not
have any of what the particular tax system attempts to tax: e.g., no net
disposable income or no real property.” 39 Over time, the subsidy theory
became the dominant explanation. 40 This theory describes the exemption
as “an attempt to help those entities that ‘do good’ for society.” 41 Thus,
the subsidy theory is said to more accurately explain the tax system
because it assumes the organization falls within the ordinary tax base, but
“views the entity as deserving of an implicit government subsidy, which

34

COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 8.
Simon et al., supra note 4, at 269 (citing I.R.C. §§ 3301–11, 4421(2)(b)).
36
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Too Close to Home: Limiting the Organizations Subsidized
by the Charitable Deduction to Those in Economic Need, 63 FLA. L. REV. 857, 862 (2011) (citing
I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c) (West 2010)); BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (citing B. A. Weisbrod, THE
NONPROFIT ECONOMY 59–79 (1988)); COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 8. The charitable
deduction “allows an individual who makes a contribution to a qualifying nonprofit to deduct the
amount of that contribution from his or her income when computing personal income tax.” Henry
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation,
91 YALE L.J. 54, 55–56 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations] (citing I.R.C. § 170). The rationale behind this benefit is that charitable nonprofits
“serve broad public purposes which transcend the personal interests of their members and
benefactors.” BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (citing B. A. Weisbrod, , THE NONPROFIT
ECONOMY 59–79 (1988)). Thus, noncharitable nonprofits are not eligible for this benefit. See
Simon et al., supra note 4, at 269 (“Contributions of cash or property (but not services) to §501(c)(3)
charities generally are tax deductible by individuals and corporations for income tax purposes (§170)
and are also deductible for estate and gift tax purposes (§§2055, 2522). Gifts to noncharitable
nonprofits generally are not deductible . . . .”); Marilyn E. Phelan, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
LAW AND TAXATION § 7.1 (West 2013) (“Rules differ for each of the classifications of tax exempt
organizations. Donations to Section 501(c)(3) organizations provide donors with charitable
contribution deductions, whereas contributions to the majority of the other tax exempt organizations
do not.”).
37
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 4; Orenbach, supra note 6, at 188 (citing Nicholas P.
Cafardi & Jaclyn Fabean Cherry, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
51 (2006)); Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 36, at 54.
38
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 22.
39
Id.; see, e.g., Simon et al., supra note 4, at 273–74; Boris I. Bittker & George F. Rahdert,
The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304
(1976).
40
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 26 (citations omitted) (“Th[e subsidy theory] is the
view of most commentators and it is also the dominant view expressed by courts interpreting the
scope of the exemption.”).
41
Id. at 5; see Simon et al., supra note 4, at 274–75.
35

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss3/3

10

Blanchard: Charitable Nonprofits & Noncompetition Agreements
BLANCHARD_CHARITABLENONPROFITS_FORMATTED

2014]

7/2/2014 6:38:14 PM

Charitable Nonprofits & Noncompetition Agreements

287

is administered by foregoing the imposition of taxes.” 42 According to
this theory, the subsidy is appropriate because the government would
otherwise have to provide the service. 43 Other proposed theories include
the capital subsidy theory (which states that nonprofits should be exempt
from taxation of their funds because they are hindered from raising
money in the first place by the non-distribution constraint), 44 the public
benefit theory (which provides that entities should be subsidized for
providing common or social goods and services), 45 and the altruism
theory (which provides that exemptions are rewards for selfless
behavior). 46
Whatever the rationale, it is clear that charitable nonprofits are
reaping significant benefits from the exemptions. In fact, it is estimated
that public charities received approximately $14 billion in income tax

42

COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 22 (citations omitted).
Orenbach, supra note 6, at 189; Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting Nonprofits, supra
note 36, at 66.
44
Orenbach, supra note 6, at 190 (citing Hansmann, Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations, supra note 36, at 54–75).
45
McCormack, supra note 36, at 865–66 (quoting William D. Andrews, Personal
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 357 (1972)); see Alice M. Thomas, ReEnvisioning the Charitable Deduction to Legislate Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our
Collective and Individual Humanity Through Sustained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
269, 324–25 (2010) (citing Simon et al., supra note 4, at 274).
46
Orenbach, supra note 6, at 191 (citing Michael J. Barry, A Sensible Alternative to
Revoking the Boy Scouts’ Tax Exemption, 30 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 137, 152 (2002)); Miranda Perry
Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 610–11
(2011) (citing Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 635
(1990)). In a similar vein, the exemption is justified by Catholic Social Thought principles in that
the exemption is viewed as a means of facilitating pursuit of the common good by encouraging
selfless behavior and “fostering the exercise of freedom, responsibility, and self-determination.”
John F. Coverdale, The Normative Justification for Tax Exemption: Elements From Catholic Social
Thought, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 889, 900 (2010). Experts have proffered similar theories to
explain the availability of the donee’s charitable deduction. See McCormack, supra note 36, at 865–
72; Thomas, supra note 45, at 323–26. For example, the tax-based rationale provides that the
donated amount is no longer available for the donee’s personal consumption and so should not be
part of the donee’s taxable income. Thomas, supra note 45, at 324 (citing Simon et al., supra note 4,
at 273). Theories of democracy promotion and pluralism state that the charitable deduction allows
individuals to allocate public funds to organizations that may not otherwise receive those funds if
they are supported by only a minority of the public. McCormack, supra note 36, at 868–69 (citing
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 165, 189 (2008)); see Fleischer, supra note 46, at 611; Thomas, supra note 45, at 325 (citing
Simon et al., supra note 4, at 275). Finally, the altruism theory holds that deductions should be
provided to reward the taxpayer for engaging in a selfless activity. McCormack, supra note 36, at
868–69 (quoting Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?,
28 TAX L. REV. 37, 60 (1972)); see Thomas, supra note 45, at 325 (citing Simon et al., supra note 4,
at 275).
43
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savings from tax exemptions in 1996 alone. 47 In addition, of the $117.9
billion in gifts made to charitable nonprofits that same year,
approximately $37.7 billion were due to donors’ ability to take a tax
And, in 2010, the amount of private charitable
deduction. 48
contributions was a staggering $290.89 billion. 49 Thus, “[i]t is hard to
overstate the importance of mission in shaping the economic study of
nonprofits.” 50
C.

CHARITABLE NONPROFITS AND NON-TRADITIONAL COMPETITION

Charitable nonprofits are unique members of the marketplace—they
“fac[e] the challenge of efficiently balancing margin and mission.” 51 In
other words, while their focus is on bettering some aspect of society
rather than solely on profit maximization, 52 charitable nonprofits must
remain profitable in order to carry out their mission. 53 This means that
47

Simon et al., supra note 4, at 272 (citing Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment
of Nonprofit Organizations: A Two-Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT:
COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 141–75 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds. 1999)). As
of 1990, “the value of the exemption [for exempt hospitals was] at $8.5 billion a year.” COLOMBO &
HALL, supra note 8, at 8 (citing John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies for NotFor-Profit Hospitals, MARCH 1990 TAX NOTES 1559, 1565).
48
Simon et al., supra note 4, at 272 (citing Brody & Cordes, supra note 47).
49
Katie L. Roeger et al., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING,
AND
VOLUNTEERING,
2011,
URBAN
INSTITUTE
1,
4,
5
fig.3
(2011),
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412434-NonprofitAlmanacBrief2011.pdf.
50
Brown & Slivinski, supra note 28, at 140.
51
CICORIA, supra note 1, at 50; see WELLFORD & GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at ix
(discussing “human services” nonprofits in particular) (“Nonprofit boards and executives must walk
a fine line between assuring the organization’s financial stability as contrasted with making financial
success the primary measure of organizational success.”).
52
See, e.g., Steinberg & Powell, supra note 6, at 9 (“Nonprofit success is evaluated in terms
of mission, rather than a simple bottom line.”); Brown & Slivinski, supra note 28, at 140 (“One
distinctive feature of nonprofit firms is that they are unlikely to set out simply to maximize profit.
They have been granted nonprofit status because of their proclaimed public purpose, and have
foresworn the opportunity to distribute profits to owners.”); CICORIA, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that
nonprofits “represent the ‘good society’, and they embody the ‘caring tradition’ of values and social
commitment that seem to have been overwhelmed by the profit motive”); see also Steinberg &
Powell, supra note 6, at 9 (“Nondistributing organizations are treated differently under our tax and
regulatory laws, amplifying their tendencies to depart from profit maximization.”).
53
See CICORIA, supra note 1, at 46 (“Nonprofit organizations can, similarly to commercial
enterprises, aggressively seek profits to finance expansion or product development, but their main
goal is to better fulfill beneficiaries[‘] and donors[‘] expectations through an increased production of
social services and goods. In other words, nonprofit organizations, instead of maximizing profits,
maximize the socially beneficial/charitable output.”). Thus, while both for-profits and nonprofits
must make profits to survive, the difference lies in what the entities can do with those profits. See
BOWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. Profits earned by nonprofit organizations must either be “retained
(as endowment, reserves, or temporarily restricted funds), reinvested (in organizational expansion or
the provision of charitable services), or given to other nonprofit organizations (as grants).”
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charitable nonprofits may find themselves engaged in competition for
profits with a variety of players. 54 While they sometimes compete with
for-profit and nonprofit entities for customer-generated profits (by
offering a superior or cheaper service—i.e., “traditional” competition), 55
they also receive a large portion of their revenue from donations and
grants available only to other nonprofits. 56 Competition for these
resources is much different because the charitable nonprofits’ success
depends greatly upon their commitment to their mission 57 rather than
solely on the attributes of the services rendered. In this respect,
charitable nonprofits engage in non-traditional competition.
II.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

In the employment context, a covenant not to compete—or
noncompetition agreement—is a promise by an employee not to engage
in the same type of business as his or her employer in a given area for a
certain amount of time after the employment relationship ends. 58
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 118 (citing Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 7);
Arnsberger et al., supra note 6, at 113 (“Even though they are considered nonprofit, public charities
use net income, the difference between total revenue and total expenses, to expand future programs
and increase endowments.”).
54
See Hines Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 1199; Tuckman, supra note 1, at 175 (“Competition
among nonprofits and between nonprofits and for-profits is a present-day reality.”).
55
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (2d pocket ed. 2001) (defining “competition” as
“[t]he effort or action of two or more commercial interests to obtain the same business from third
parties”); CICORIA, supra note 1, at 18 (“[I]n commercial fields, nonprofits directly compete against
business-for-profit firms for customers and clients . . . .”); see also id. at 31 (“In the case of nonprofit
organizations, competition exists when, in the same market, two or more agencies provide the same
services and goods, sharing the same altruistic goal.”). For example, nonprofit hospitals compete
with for-profit hospitals for patients in some instances.
56
See Roeger et al., supra note 49, at 3, 3 fig. 2 (indicating that public charities received
approximately 13.6% of their revenues in 2009 from private contributions and approximately 8.9%
from government grants); CICORIA, supra note 1, at 18 (“[I]n the charitable-social fields, [nonprofits]
compete against other nonprofit organizations for donors and grants.”).
57
See CICORIA, supra note 1, at 31 (“[T]he main difference which distinguishes nonprofits’
competition from competition among for-profit firms is the lack of self-interested motives.”); see
also id. at 33 (discussing Howard Tuckman’s analysis of nonprofits’ behavior in a competitive
market and stating that, in regard to donors, “reputation and effectiveness in complying with the
socially beneficial task are considered to be the most useful weapons against other competitors”);
Tuckman, supra note 1, at 178 (“Donations to nonprofits are determined, in part, by the value donors
place on their services; nonprofits with highly valued missions offering services in scarce supply
(relative to demand) may find fund-raising easier than do those with less highly valued missions.”).
58
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (8th ed. 2004); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants,
Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001); Michael
J. Hutter, Drafting Enforceable Employee Non-Competition Agreements to Protect Confidential
Business Information: A Lawyer’s Practical Approach to the Case Law, 45 ALB. L. REV. 311, 312
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Variations of noncompetition agreements have been in existence since
mediaeval times, 59 and they serve important and useful purposes in a
marketplace otherwise guided by principles of free competition. One
longstanding purpose is to prevent employees from learning their
employers’ secrets only to leave and set up a competing business in the
employers’ backyard. 60 And, as employee mobility continues to
increase, employers are using these agreements to prevent employees
from taking confidential information learned during their tenure to a new
job with a competitor. 61
Given the apparent benefits conferred by noncompetition
agreements, and the principle of freedom of contract 62 upon which
American society is based, 63 some would argue that noncompetition
agreements should be enforced as long as they are entered into by

(1980–81); Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626
(1960). This section of the Article will provide a brief overview of the law regarding employment
noncompetition agreements. For more information, see RICHARD A. LORD, 6 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 13 (4th ed.) and DONALD J. ASPELUND & STEPHEN L. LUNDWALL, EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETITION LAW (Westlaw 2011). For an empirical study of noncompetition agreements, see
Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J.
CORP. L. 483 (1989–1990).
59
See Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35
YALE L.J. 905, 920 (1926); LORD, supra note 58, § 13.2 (citing a case from the year 1600);
Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 760 (2002).
60
Jones, supra note 59, at 921 (citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed.
271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), modified on other grounds, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)); see Hutter, supra note
58, at 311–12 (discussing employers’ use of noncompetition agreements to prevent serious monetary
losses resulting from the transfer of confidential business information to a competitor). Covenants
not to compete also have long been used in conjunction with the sale of a business. See Charles E.
Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 245 (1928) (“[T]he English
courts early supported agreements not to compete where they were part of a sale of property or a
business, and were appropriate as a protection of the property or business retained or sold . . . .”). In
that instance, the function of the covenant is to maintain honesty and protect business’ goodwill by
preventing a person from selling his business to an innocent buyer only to turn around and open a
rival business across the street. See Jones, supra note 59, at 921 (citing Addyston, 85 Fed. at 280).
61
Hutter, supra note 58, at 311–12.
62
“Freedom of contract” is “[t]he doctrine that people have the right to bind themselves
legally; a judicial concept that contracts are based on mutual agreement and free choice, and thus
should not be hampered by external control . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 689 (8th ed. 2004);
see Jeffrey G. Grody, Partial Enforcement of Post-Employment Restrictive Covenants, 15 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 195 (1979) (“[F]reedom-of-contract[ is] the notion that private parties
should be free to structure mutual agreements with full confidence that the legal system will enforce
them.”).
63
See Whitmore, supra note 58, at 486 (“[T]he freedom to contract . . . has been protected by
American courts since the early nineteenth century. This doctrine has existed to ‘encourage
individual entrepreneurial activity’ and has ‘been extolled as one of the great boons of modern
democratic civilization, as one of the principal causes of prosperity and comfort.’”
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competent parties and are neither illegal nor unconscionable. 64
However, significant public policy concerns are raised by the use of
noncompetition agreements—most notably, that they unduly restrain
trade. 65 And, employees have been challenging their noncompetition
agreements on those grounds for centuries. 66 Under fifteenth-century
English common law, for example, covenants not to compete were
determined to be wholly unlawful because they “might have the effect of
making [the obligor] and his family a charge upon the community as well
as depriving the community of the benefit of his competition.” 67
Similarly, in one early United States case, a state court enumerated
several reasons for finding noncompetition agreements to be inherently
unreasonable, including that they diminish the ability of a person to
procure a livelihood, deprive the public of services by those most capable
of rendering them, discourage enterprise, and hinder competition. 68
64

See Brandon S. Long, Note, Protecting Employer Investment in Training: Noncompetes vs.
Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1302–03 (2005); Maureen B. Callahan, Comment,
Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 725–27 (1985).
65
See Whitmore, supra note 58, at 486 (discussing the competing doctrines involved in the
noncompetition clause arena—that of freedom to contract and that against restraints of trade).
66
See Hutter, supra note 58, at 312 – 313 (“In view of the number of decisions reported each
year involving . . . non-competition agreements, it also appears to be quite common for employees to
breach them and contend that they are illegal.”). For a detailed discussion of the common law
origins of post-employment covenants not to compete, see Mark A. Glick et al., The Law and
Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 357,
360–368 (2002) and Blake, supra note 58, at 629–46.
67
Jones, supra note 59, at 920; see Carpenter, supra note 60, at 244–45 (discussing fifteenthand sixteenth-century English cases and stating that they “seem to make no point of the narrowness
of the restriction either as to space or time, but treat all such covenants as void” in part because “an
agreement not to carry on a trade or to refrain from competing with the covenantee might have
greatly injured the covenantor by divesting him of his only means of earning a livelihood”); Colgate
v. Bacheler, 1600 WL 41 (K.B. 1600), 78 E.R. 1097, (1600) Cro. Eliz. 872 (“[I]t was resolved by the
Court, that this condition is against law, to prohibit or restrain any to use a lawful trade at any time,
or at any place; for as well as he may restrain him for one time or place, he may restrain him for
longer times and more places, which is against the benefit of the commonwealth; for being freemen,
it is free for them to exercise their trade in any place.”).
68
Jones, supra note 59, at 920–21 (citing Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51, 54 (Mass. 1837));
see Carpenter, supra note 60, at 253 (“[T]he real objections to contracts not to compete are: ([1]) that
they divest the promisor of his means of earning a livelihood and supporting himself and his family;
and (2) that they deprive the community of (a) the benefit of his services and (b) the benefit which
his competition might offer.”). Those concerns are still present today. See Hutter, supra note 58, at
317 (“Most courts, however, approach [non-competition] agreements with great skepticism,
recognizing that their enforcement interferes to some extent with an individual’s freedom to pursue
his/her calling, and with the mobility of talent within the economy.”); Norman D. Bishara,
Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation From Employee
Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
287, 311 (2006) (“Abolishment proponents argue that noncompetes should not be enforced because:
(1) they restrain trade and keep important information from the public, (2) they can cause an overall
loss to society by depriving it of valuable services, and (3) employees have unequal bargaining
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Over time, “as business developed and the value of good will
became understood, as individual freedom of movement and action was
secured, and as corporations became factors in trade and commerce,”
courts began using a reasonableness test to determine whether a
particular noncompetition agreement was valid. 69 There are two main
considerations under this test:
[F]irst, it is necessary to decide whether the non-competition
agreement is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate needs of
the employer; and second, whether the non-competition agreement is
reasonable with respect to the nature of the temporal and geographic
restraints and the activity proscribed. 70

Courts also will look to the effect of the agreement on the public
interest. 71 Thus, the courts began to balance the competing policies. 72 A

power and need protection to ensure their ability to pursue a chosen livelihood and mobility.”);
Long, supra note 64, at 1304–05 (discussing concerns that employment noncompetition agreements
are anticompetitive, affect workers’ livelihoods, allow employers to exploit the disparity in
bargaining power, and deprive society of individuals’ productivity). But see Callahan, supra note
64, at 706–07, 712–25 (arguing that the notions that noncompetition agreements are anticompetitive,
unfair, and harmful to society lack merit).
69
Jones, supra note 59, at 921; see Hutter, supra note 58, at 318 (discussing the English
courts’ “balancing of interests standard” and its adoption and articulation by the American courts “as
a standard of ‘reasonableness’” (citations omitted)).
70
Hutter, supra note 58, at 318–19 (citing Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d
489, 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Briggs v. Butler, 45 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ohio 1942)); see Long, supra
note 64, at 1308 (discussing the two-part test used by courts to determine the enforceability of
noncompetition agreements).
71
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981); Glick et al., supra note 66, at
371 (quoting KURT H. DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 44 (1993) (“The ‘reasonableness of
a covenant has typically been determined by whether (i) the restraint protects a legitimate interest of
the employer, not greater than necessary to protect that interest, and reasonably related to the interest
being protected; (ii) the restraint does not unreasonably prevent the employee from earning a
livelihood; and (iii) the restraint is in accord with public policy.’”)); Carroll R. Wetzel, Employment
Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements, U. ILL. L.F. 61, 61–62 (1969) (citing RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932)). But see Blake, supra note 58, at 686 (“[T]he recognized
method of decision is that of balancing the employer’s claims to protection against the burden on the
employee. Once the judgment is made, almost never does a court proceed to consider possible
injury to society as a separate matter. This is not surprising, for the balancing process engaged in
will almost always result in maximizing the social values as well as those of the parties.”).
72
See Bishara, supra note 68, at 298 & n.42 (“The question is one of balancing, on one hand,
the terms of a contract that is on its face a restraint on trade, and on the other hand, concerns about
protecting an employer’s goodwill and investment in an employee’s human capital.”); Hutter, supra
note 58, at 318 (citing Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg., Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 369 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y.
1977)); Long, supra note 64, at 1305 (“Often, courts use a balancing test whereby the various policy
considerations are weighed to determine the outcome best attuned to the interests of the employee,
employer, and the general public.” (citations omitted)); Ronald R. Barrick, Note, An Employer’s
Competitive Restraints on Former Employees, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 69, 71 (1967–68) (citations
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restraint on competition may be permitted, but only when and where it is
necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests and is not
harmful to the public. 73
Under the first prong of the reasonableness test, a court will
examine whether the employer has “a real need for protection.” 74
Accordingly, where an employee had access to the employer’s trade
secrets or confidential customer information, or where the employee built
close, exclusive relationships with customers, courts often will find that
an employer has a legitimate need for protection. 75 On the other hand, a
bare desire to discourage an employee from changing jobs so as not to
lose the employer’s investment in training, or an attempt to prevent
competition by an individual who has acquired general knowledge and
skills at the employer’s expense, generally is insufficient. 76
Under the second prong of the reasonableness test, a court will
determine whether the scope of the noncompetition agreement is broader
than necessary—in terms of time, territory, and subject matter—to
protect the employer’s legitimate interests. 77 For example, an agreement
is considered reasonable in terms of temporal scope for the useful life of
the claimed trade secrets or for the amount of time necessary for the
employer to train a new employee and acquaint him or her with the

omitted) (“In short, the problem encountered is a three way balancing of the equities. The employer
needs insurance against unfair competition which must not be obtained at the expense of the public
who is entitled to the employees’ industry and services nor at the expense of the employee who must
be able to pursue his calling and earn a livelihood.”).
73
See Long, supra note 64, at 1308 (“If the agreement is unreasonable in its scope,
geographic boundaries, or duration, . . . [and] these unreasonableness factors sufficiently outweigh
the employer’s protectable interests, the noncompete will be voided.”); Gary P. Kreider, Trends in
the Enforcement of Restrictive Employment Contracts, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 16, 17 (1966) (citations
omitted) (“American courts have upheld contracts restricting future employment so long as the
limitations they imposed were reasonable and not injurious to the public.”). For an empirical study
of noncompetition clause cases and the importance of the individual reasonableness factors to the
outcomes in litigation, see Whitmore, supra note 58.
74
Hutter, supra note 58, at 319.
75
Id. at 320–21; Long, supra note 64, at 1309–10; Grody, supra note 62, at 183–84; Blake,
supra note 58, at 653; see also id. at 653–74 (discussing the types of customer relationships and
confidential information that are protectable as legitimate employer interests).
76
Hutter, supra note 58, at 320; Grody, supra note 62, at 185; Lester, supra note 58, at 57
(discussing “employer investments in training”); Blake supra note 58, at 651–53; Long, supra note
64, at 1310–12. Contra Stone, supra note 59, at 751 (“Recently, . . . courts have justified enforcing
covenants [not to compete] on the ground that the employer paid for an employee’s training to
acquire skills and is thus entitled to prevent the employee from utilizing those skills on behalf of a
competitor, even when there is no trade secret involved.”).
77
See Hutter, supra note 58, at 329. This prong of the reasonableness test deals with the
employee’s interest in “maintain[ing] his mobility in the labor market.” See Grody, supra note 62, at
186.
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customers. 78 As for geographic scope, a restraint must not extend
beyond the area in which the employer does business or the employee
contacted customers—i.e., “the area in which the employer could suffer
economic harm from the employee’s activities.” 79 In the Internet Age,
and in our increasingly global economy, however, courts will not
necessarily strike down a noncompetition agreement for lack of a
territorial restriction and will permit national and global restrictions in
appropriate cases. 80 Finally, a noncompetition agreement may only
restrain an employee from performing the same type of activities for a
competitor that the employee performed for the employer, or from
contacting parties who were customers of the employer during the
employee’s tenure. 81
While a noncompetition agreement’s effect on the public interest
traditionally played a small role in the reasonableness test, the weight
accorded to this factor has grown. 82 Today, courts will consider
society’s interests in competition and in an employer’s ability to trust its
employees, 83 as well as society’s need for a particular employee’s
services. 84 Thus, should an agreement cause the removal of a productive

78

See Blake, supra note 58, at 677–78; Hutter, supra note 58, at 332–35.
Hutter, supra note 58, at 329–32; see Lester, supra note 58, at 56–57 (citations omitted)
(“As for geography, courts focus on whether the restraint exceeds the geographic area or territory in
which the employee formerly worked, or where the employer conducted its business.”).
80
See Hutter, supra note 58, at 329–31 (discussing how the “old view that any territorial
restraint covering an entire state or the nation is per se unreasonable is no longer valid”); Stone,
supra note 59, at 741 (“What a court considers to be reasonable duration and geographic scope
varies from state to state and case to case. . . . Recently, some courts have upheld covenants that are
wider in geographic scope than those they would have affirmed in the past on the grounds that the
firm seeking to enforce the covenant competes in a nationwide or worldwide market.”); LORD, supra
note 58, § 13:5 (stating that a covenant not to compete that is not limited as to geographic scope or
that restrains competition within the entire country is not necessarily invalid per se as long as it is
limited as to time and is reasonable overall).
81
See Hutter, supra note 58, at 335 (discussing appropriate activity restrictions in
noncompetition agreements); Lester, supra note 58, at 57 (citations omitted) (“Some restraints are
invalidated because they restrict an unreasonably broad range of vocational activities, although more
tailored restraints that simply prevent the employee from dealing with former customers may be
deemed reasonable.”).
82
See Glick et al., supra note 66, at 372–73 (“In early American common law, the [public
interest] factor was not dispositive, merely tipping the scales in favor of either the employer or
employee. However, in modern American common law, this factor may be dispositive if the
restriction may harm the public.”).
83
Grody, supra note 62, at 187–88.
84
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (1981); Grody, supra note 62,
at 187–88 (stating that the public interest favors “maintenance of adequate supplies of services[] and
full use of labor resources”).
79
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and necessary employee from society, the injury to the public may be too
great. 85
The validity of noncompetition agreements and the ability to enter
into such covenants in the United States are governed at the state level by
the common law standards articulated above 86 or by statute, depending
upon the jurisdiction. 87 Even in most of those states with statutes,
85

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (1981) (“[T]he likely injury to
the public may be too great if it is seriously harmed by the impairment of [the employee’s] economic
mobility or by the unavailability of the skills developed in his employment.”). But see Kreider,
supra note 73, at 19 (“In actuality, all restraints are bound to have a harmful effect on the public,
since by limiting the mobility and supply of labor and the spread of business skills and information,
they interfere with operation of the competitive economy . . . . Therefore, to present a problem to the
enforceability of an employment contract which was otherwise valid, it would appear that some
special injury to the public would have to be present.”).
86
State and federal antitrust laws also may be relevant, as are general principles of contract
law. See Wetzel, supra note 71, at 62 (citations omitted) (“[O]ccasionally [state antitrust] statutes
have been construed to prohibit even incidental noncompetition agreements where their inhibitive
effect upon competition has been significant.”); id. at 67 (citations omitted) (“If . . . the
noncompetition agreement is only one weapon in an arsenal of devices to restrain trade or foster
monopoly, the [federal] antitrust laws are violated.”); Glick et al., supra note 66, at 370, 408–17
(noting that noncompetition agreements may be subject to the Sherman Act); Grody, supra note 62,
at 190 (“Contract law provides the legal foundation for enforcement [of covenants not to compete].
Its message is that the covenant should be enforced if the employee’s promise is supported by legally
sufficient consideration.”).
87
Nineteen states have enacted statutes governing the general use of post-employment
covenants not to compete. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (2012); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–
16602.5 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 542.33–
542.335 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-8-50 to 13-8-59 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 4804(c) (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 44-2701 to 44-2704 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:921 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.202
(West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to 28-2-705 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 613.200(4) (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 908-06 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295
(West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (West 2011); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50–
15.52 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2012). The other states and the District of
Columbia rely solely on common law. See generally, e.g., Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62
(Alaska 1988); Bryceland v. Northey, 772 P.2d 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Girard v. Rebsamen Ins.
Co., 685 S.W.2d 526 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985); New Haven Tobacco Co. v. Perrelli, 528 A.2d 865
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987); McCann Surveyors, Inc. v. Evans, 611 A.2d 1 (Del. Ch. 1987); Ellis v. James
v. Hurson Assocs., Inc., 565 A.2d 615 (D.C. 1989); Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human
Res. Grp., Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Commercial Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Smith, 516 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Baker v. Starkey, 144 N.W.2d 889 (Iowa 1966); Weber
v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1996); Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988); Becker v. Bailey,
299 A.2d 835 (Md. 1973); Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 175 N.E.2d 374 (Mass. 1961);
Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1965); Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain,
599 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1992); Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900 (Neb. 1982);
Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310 (N.H. 1979); Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 264
A.2d 53 (N.J. 1970); Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy, 417 P.2d 450 (N.M. 1966); Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394 (N.Y. 1981); Premier Assocs., Ltd. v. Loper, 778 N.E.2d 630 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002); Boldt Mach. & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 366 A.2d 902 (Pa. 1976); Max Garelick, Inc. v.
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however, the reasonableness of the covenant is still a concern. 88 Only
two states—California and North Dakota—ignore the reasonableness test
and forbid the use of employee noncompetition agreements altogether. 89
These state laws control in diversity of citizenship cases in federal court,
as well. 90

Leonardo, 250 A.2d 354 (R.I. 1969); Oxman v. Profitt, 126 S.E.2d 852 (S.C. 1962); Allright Auto
Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 1966); Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah
1983); Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 315 A.2d 456 (Vt. 1974); Roanoke Eng’g Sales Co. v.
Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d 882 (Va. 1982); Perry v. Moran, 748 P.2d 224 (Wash. 1987); Voorhees v.
Guyan Mach. Co, 446 S.E.2d 672 (W. Va. 1994); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d
531 (Wyo. 1993). For a comprehensive review of the relevant state laws, see BRIAN M.
MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Robert A. Blackstone
& Arnold H. Pedowitz et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
88
See generally, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Etheridge, 582 So. 2d 1102 (Ala.
1991); Miller v. Kendall, 541 P.2d 126 (Colo. App. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335; GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 13-8-53, 13-8-56, 13-8-57 (West 2013); Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163 (Haw.
1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 44-2701–44-2704 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774(a)
(West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.202 (West 2013); State Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v. Am.
Med. Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.200(4) (West 2013);
Manpower of Guilford Cnty., Inc. v. Hedgecock, 257 S.E.2d 109 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Cohen
Realty, Inc. v. Marinick, 817 P.2d 747 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
15.50–15.52 (West 2013); Fields Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
89
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600, et seq (West 2013). (“Except [as used in
conjunction with the sale of a business or interest in a business], every contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-06 (“Every contract by which anyone is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void, except: [as used
in conjunction with the sale of a business or in the dissolution of a partnership].”). Two states,
Hawaii and Oklahoma, allow noncompetition agreements to the extent they only prevent the
disclosure of trade secrets or the direct solicitation of the former employer’s customers, respectively.
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c) (West 2013) (“[I]t shall be lawful for a person to enter into any of
the following restrictive covenants or agreements ancillary to a legitimate purpose not violative of
this chapter, unless the effect thereof may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the State: . . . covenant or agreement by an
employee or agent not to use the trade secrets of the employer or principal in competition with the
employee’s or agent’s employer or principal, during the term of the agency or thereafter, or after the
termination of employment, within such time as may be reasonably necessary for the protection of
the employer or principal, without imposing undue hardship on the employee or agent.”) (emphasis
added); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (West 2013) (“A person who makes an agreement with an
employer, whether in writing or verbally, not to compete with the employer after the employment
relationship has been terminated, shall be permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted
by the former employer or in a similar business as that conducted by the former employer as long as
the former employee does not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a combination of goods
and services from the established customers of the former employer. . . . Any provision in a contract
between an employer and an employee in conflict with the provisions of this section shall be void
and unenforceable.”) (emphasis added).
90
Marshall H. Tanick & Phillip J. Trobaugh, Noncompetes for Professionals: It’s Not for
Amateurs, BENCH & BAR OF MINN. 22, 22 (March 2012) (“The federal courts, when confronted with
noncompete clauses in diversity of citizenship cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, follow applicable state
law under the Erie doctrine.”).
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III. FEDERAL LAW SHOULD RENDER UNENFORCEABLE
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS PREVENTING EMPLOYEE
MOBILITY BETWEEN CHARITABLE NONPROFITS
As discussed above, the law governing noncompetition agreements
has slowly evolved to deal with modern society’s increasingly global and
mobile marketplace. In turn, academics have suggested additional
reformation to ensure the law truly keeps pace with reality. For example,
one scholar, Norman D. Bishara, has advocated for enforcement of
noncompetition agreements based on the public policy implications of
the nature of the employee’s status as either a “creative” or “service”
employee. 91 Professor Bishara argued that covenants not to compete
should not be enforced against “creative” workers, who develop
products, because innovation should be encouraged. 92 But, he argued,
covenants not to compete should be enforced against “service” workers,
who use their skills and the developed products to render services,
because a company’s interest in confidentiality and client development
should be respected. 93 However, rather than enforcing—or refusing to
enforce—noncompetition agreements based on the nature of the
employee or based solely on the public policy concerns discussed
earlier, 94 this Article proposes a distinction based on the nature of the
employer: To the extent noncompetition agreements are used to prevent
an employee of one charitable nonprofit from leaving and working for
another charitable nonprofit, the agreements should be considered
unenforceable. A federal mandate is necessary to effectively implement
this rule on a national scale.

91

See Bishara, supra note 68, at 293 (“[T]here are consistent, common implications for
categorizing workers in an information economy as ‘service’ or ‘creative’ employees for [covenants
not to compete] . . . [and] within the service and creative job categories, [covenants not to compete]
can be selectively enforced to create positive spillovers and maximize useful knowledge transfers.”).
92
Id. at 313, 321. One example of a “creative” employee is a chemist who researches new
drugs. Id. at 313.
93
Id. at 313–14, 320–21. Examples of a “service” employee are the pharmaceutical
salesperson who sells drugs and the pharmacist who prescribes the drugs. See id. at 313–14.
94
See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. The public interest is an important factor
and, in the context of a charitable nonprofit organization, there is an argument that this factor alone
should be sufficient to invalidate the use of noncompetition agreements. However, this Article
focuses on the inappropriateness of noncompetition agreements based on the characteristics of the
charitable nonprofit organization.
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THE PROBLEM: NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS ARE
INAPPROPRIATE AND UNNECESSARY FOR USE BETWEEN
CHARITABLE NONPROFITS

It is inappropriate and unnecessary for a charitable nonprofit to
prevent an employee from leaving to work for another charitable
nonprofit for two main reasons. First, noncompetition agreements are
contrary to charitable nonprofits’ missions of furthering society’s best
interests, and use of such agreements contravenes the reasons for
granting those organizations tax-exempt status in the first place.
Moreover, as a result of their missions and tax-exempt status, charitable
nonprofits do not engage in “traditional” competition and, therefore,
should not be allowed to use traditional profit-maximizing tools to their
advantage. Second, there exist equally effective, alternative methods of
protecting a charitable nonprofit’s legitimate business interests.
1.

Noncompetition agreements are contrary to the mission and taxexempt status of the charitable nonprofit organization

While the use of noncompetition agreements to prevent employee
mobility often is aligned with the for-profit mission of increasing
revenue and rewarding shareholders, use of those agreements is directly
contrary to the charitable nonprofit’s mission of bettering society.95
Recall the mission statements of the charitable nonprofits listed above,
through which the organizations pledged, among other things, to
“provide relief to victims of disaster,” “to contribute to health and well95

See Eleanor D. Kinney, Symposium Introduction, Hospital-Physician Joint Ventures: A
Promising Partnership?, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 205, 207 (2007) (discussing an observation made
by Steve Pratt, a law firm partner, that a community-based hospital’s use of noncompetition
agreements with its physicians “is somewhat inconsistent with the theory that underlies the nonprofit
community-based hospitals—to serve the community.”). One recent case dealt with a similar
argument. In Healthcare Services of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Copeland, two individuals had signed
noncompetition agreements with their former employer, a not-for-profit corporation. 198 S.W.3d
604, 607, 614 (Mo. 2006). In the agreements, the individuals promised not to engage in a
competitive business within a 100-mile radius for a period of two years following the end of their
employment. See id. at 607–08. Within days of leaving their employment, the individuals accepted
jobs at a competing for-profit business. See id. at 608. The former employees argued that “the
noncompete agreements [we]re not enforceable as a matter of public policy because [the former
employer] [wa]s a not-for-profit corporation and [w]as not entitled to ‘restrain trade in the conduct
of charitable activities.’” Id. at 614. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument on the
grounds that nonprofit and for-profit entities have the same corporate powers and equally-protectable
business interests, stating that the only difference was what the entities did with their earnings. See
id. Contrary to the argument in this Article, however, the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding in that
case dealt only with a nonprofit’s right to use noncompetition agreements to protect itself from
unfair competition by for-profit competitors.
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being,” and “to provide service to people in need.” 96 Society is the
ultimate benefactor of those organizations’ services. Now consider, for
example, an individual whose employment at such an entity has ended
due to organizational restructuring, but who is prevented by virtue of a
noncompetition agreement from utilizing his or her expertise and joining
the staff of a similar charitable organization. 97 In that situation—and in
countless other loss-of-employment situations—the result is a net loss to
society.
Not only might enforcement of a noncompetition agreement in such
situations cause an outcome that conflicts with the charitable nonprofits’
purposes, but the action of requiring an individual to sign a
noncompetition agreement itself might cause the same conflict with the
charitable nonprofits’ purposes.
Knowing that a noncompetition
agreement will limit the options available to an employee upon leaving
the employer (and, therefore, that it will effectively limit the employee’s
ability to quit), an individual may decide not to join an organization
where his or her skills and compassion would be utilized to serve society
in the first place, if signing a noncompetition agreement is a requirement
of employment. 98 Again, this results in a net loss to society and is
directly contrary to the typical charitable nonprofit’s mission.
Because the altruistic mission is intrinsically tied to the charitable
nonprofit’s characterization as a § 501(c)(3) organization, the use of
noncompetition agreements also is in direct conflict with the charitable
nonprofit’s tax-exempt status. As discussed above, in order to qualify as
a § 501(c)(3) organization, an entity must be “organized and operated
exclusively” for a charitable purpose. As noted by two prominent
scholars, “there are important differences in how most nonprofits
function as compared with for-profit activities. The difference lies in . . .
the reasons why a service is offered—to benefit the individual and the
community, not to make a profit.” 99 Thus, employing a business tactic

96

See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
This example is not based on specific, real-life events, and the author has no information
as to whether the organizations whose mission statements are referenced herein utilize
noncompetition agreements.
98
See Bishara, supra note 68, at 289 (“While there is little empirical research on the use of
noncompetes, there are indications that such agreements are increasingly common and as a result
this sort of post-employment restriction will influence the decisions of employers and employees.”);
Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 407 (2006–2007) (“But
perhaps the most troubling effect of non-compete covenants is that, by limiting what the employee
can do after leaving the job, they also burden the ability to quit, and with it the ability to demand
better wages and working conditions and to resist oppressive conditions in the current job.”).
99
WELLFORD & GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at ix–x.
97
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that places the organization’s financial interests above society’s interests
should raise a red flag for the Internal Revenue Service. 100
Moreover, per their § 501(c)(3) status, charitable nonprofits already
receive advantages that for-profit entities—and even other categories of
nonprofit entities—do not, such as exemptions from federal income tax
and their donors’ ability to deduct charitable contributions. 101 As
discussed above, these allowances cause charitable nonprofits to engage
in a different type of competition depending upon the type of competitor
they face. Charitable nonprofits engage in traditional competition (i.e.,
for customers) with their for-profit counterparts, but in non-traditional
competition (i.e., for donors, grants, and customers) with other charitable
nonprofits. Thus, because charitable organizations are engaged in nontraditional competition with each other, they should not be allowed to use
noncompetition agreements—traditional, profit-maximizing tools of
competition—to their advantage. 102

100

See Elizabeth A. Weeks, The New Economic Credentialing: Protecting Hospitals from
Competition by Medical Staff Members, 36 J. HEALTH L. 247, 282–83 (2003); Hansmann, Evolving
Law, supra note 5, at 827 (“In fiscal law, . . . and especially in the area of taxation, there is a good
case for discriminating among different types of nonprofits according to the functions they serve,
and in particular for being more discriminating than in the past by granting exemption only to
organizations that are truly charitable.”); Hansmann, Evolving Law, supra note 5, at 822 (“[T]here is
a good argument for removing the exemption from commercial nonprofits that are anachronistic or
opportunistic.”). But see Wexford Med. Grp. v. City of Cadillac, 713 N.W.2d 734, 748 (Mich. 2006)
(finding that an entity’s use of noncompetition agreements was not sufficient to cause it to lose its
charitable status). For example, “[a] nonprofit hospital’s decision to adopt a policy to restrict or
eliminate competition by medical staff members may affect the hospital’s status as a charitable
organization.” Weeks, supra, at 282. Employing such policies “has the appearance of placing the
financial bottom-line of the hospital—and, accordingly, the benefit of hospital administrators and
shareholders—above charitable purposes,” and could “cause the IRS to question whether the
hospital is organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes.” Id. at 283; see Kinney,
supra note 94, at 207 (“While [nonprofit community-based] hospitals have an obligation to remain
financially healthy, tying up physicians with non-competes in a way that is good for the hospital but
not good for the community is inconsistent with the theory of tax-exempt organizations.”).
101
See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
102
While this Article does not propose that charitable nonprofits should be prohibited from
using noncompetition agreements to prevent their employees from leaving to work for a for-profit
competitor, an argument for such a proposition exists because the tax breaks charitable nonprofits
receive per their § 501(c)(3) status already serve as a buffer against competition. See Tuckman,
supra note 1, at 187 (stating that “[t]he subsidies that 501(c)(3) organizations receive offer some
cushion against competition”); Rudnick, supra note 9, at 326 (“Tax exemptions give nonprofits a
competitive advantage over for-profit organizations.”).
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Charitable nonprofits can use alternative means to protect their
legitimate business interests

This Article does not propose that charitable nonprofits should be
left defenseless when it comes to protecting their trade secrets and
confidential client information. Rather, it suggests that charitable
nonprofits can effectively protect those interests by use of mechanisms
that are less onerous than noncompetition agreements, including the law
of unfair competition, confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements,
nonsolicitation agreements, and incentive-based policies. 103 While, in
some ways, these tools may not be as iron-clad or easy to enforce as
noncompetition agreements, 104 they are better-suited to the nature of the
charitable nonprofit and will adequately protect an organization’s
legitimate business interests.
First, an employer may protect its confidential information by
invoking the law of unfair competition, which prohibits the
misappropriation of trade secrets, against a former employee. 105 To
establish a valid claim, an employer must show that the information it
seeks to protect is a trade secret (i.e., that it is commercially valuable
because it is not generally known or readily ascertainable to others, and
that it is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy) and that the
former employee has improperly acquired, disclosed, or used the trade
secret or has threatened to do so. 106 Relying on the law of unfair

103

See Estlund, supra note 97, at 395 (describing nondisclosure and nonsolicitation
agreements as “less restrictive alternatives” because they “do not tread on the employee’s ability to
work”). Other proposed alternatives include requiring employees to pay, through reduced wages, for
access to the employer’s trade secrets or monitoring use of confidential information such that no
single employee has access to the entire trade secret. See Lester, supra note 58, at 51–52. Those
less common methods will not be discussed in this Article.
104
See, e.g., Hutter, supra note 58, at 314 (“[I]t can be easily seen that the use of employee
non-competition agreements is the primary and most effective way to guard against unauthorized use
of confidential business information by an ex-employee.”).
105
See, e.g., Hutter, supra note 58, at 314; Stone, supra note 59, at 738, 756–57.
106
See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1–2 (1985). These are the elements of a
misappropriation of trade secrets claim under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a version of which has
been adopted by forty-six states. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (West 2012); ALASKA STAT.
ANN. §§ 45.50.910–45.50.945 (West 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to 44-407 (2012);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to 4-75-607 (West 2012); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426–3426.11 (West
2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-74-101 to 7-74-110 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 35-50 to 35-58 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001–2009 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 688.001–688.009 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-767 (West 2011); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 482B-1 to 482B-9 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-801 to 48-807 (West 2012);
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/1–1065/9 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8
(West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1–550.8 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to 603330 (West 2011); KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880–365.900 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
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competition has its downsides: disclosure may seem unavoidable when
the former employee is engaging in a similar occupation, and the
necessary evidence of misconduct often is hard to come by. 107 However,
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure allows courts to provide an
injunction against competition even in the absence of actual
misappropriation where an employer can demonstrate that a former
employee “will necessarily disclose” a particular trade secret learned
from the employer in the course of the new employment. 108 Thus, a
cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets provides a viable
alternative to a noncompetition agreement.

§§ 51:143–51:1439 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541–1548 (2011); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1201 to 11-1209 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1901–
445.1910 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01–325C.08 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
75-26-1 to 75-26-19 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450–417.467 (West 2012); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to 30-14-409 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-501 to 87-507 (West
2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010 –600A.100 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350B:1 to 350-B:9 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to 57-3A-7 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-25.1-01 to 45-25.1-08 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:15-1 to 56:15-9 (West 2012);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61–1333.69 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85–95 (West
2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646.461–646.475 (West 2012); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301–
5308 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 6-41-1 to 6-41-11 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 398-20 to 39-8-130 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-29-1 to 37-29-11 (West 2011); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1701 to 47-25-1709 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to 13-24-9
(West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4601–4609 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to
59.1-343 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010–19.108.940 (West 2012); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-22-1 to 47-22-10 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 2011); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-24-101 to 40-24-110 (West 2012). The elements are similar at common law. See
Hutter, supra note 58, at 314 (citing 1 R. MILGRAM, TRADE SECRETS § 3.02 (1979) (“[T]he courts
are in general agreement that liability [for trade secret misappropriation] requires proof of two
essential elements: that the information qualifies as a trade secret and that the ex-employee is using
or threatens to use the trade secret to the ex-employer’s detriment.”).
107
See Hutter, supra note 58, at 314–15 (discussing the pitfalls of relying on a
misappropriation of trade secrets claim for protection, including the burden of demonstrating that use
or disclosure has occurred or is imminent); see also id. at 317 (“To be sure, the employer must
establish the ‘reasonableness’ of the non-competition agreement, but this burden is usually less
difficult than the burden of establishing actual or imminent use.”) (citations omitted); Grody, supra
note 62, at 184 (“The law of unfair competition might afford some protection . . . . A written
agreement, however, gives the employer access to a more favorable body of law and is likely to
entitle him to somewhat broader relief than may otherwise be obtainable.”). Another concern is that,
“even if the employer discovers misappropriation and pursues legal redress, additional leaks of the
confidential information [could occur] in the course of legal proceedings.” Lester, supra note 58, at
53.
108
See Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee Mobility v.
Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 166, 168 (2004). “[T]he doctrine prohibits employees
from using or disclosing any trade secrets of a former employer, [but] does not prevent employees
from using any skills or general knowledge that they acquired through their work experience.” Id. at
166–67. Not all jurisdictions recognize this doctrine, and others require a showing of bad faith on
the part of the former employee or irreparable harm to the employer in addition to a demonstration
of inevitable disclosure. Id. at 173, 176–77.
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Second, instead of limiting where and for whom an individual can
work, an employer can limit the information the individual can use in his
or her future employment through a confidentiality or nondisclosure
agreement. 109 These agreements typically prevent former employees
from using or disclosing to a competitor specific, confidential
information obtained during their employment. 110 While there are
several problems with nondisclosure agreements (e.g., they may be
somewhat difficult to enforce because an employer will not be able to
monitor its former employees’ communications with a new employer, 111
it may be difficult to specify with particularity at the outset of
employment the information that should be deemed confidential, 112 and
the employer would rather prevent the disclosure from occurring
altogether rather than simply have a remedy for it after-the-fact 113 ), these
agreements are preferable to noncompetition agreements because they
are more narrowly-tailored to the employer’s legitimate business
interests. Furthermore, enforcing nondisclosure agreements is more
efficient for employers than seeking recourse through unfair competition
law because the information at issue need not satisfy the legal definition
of a trade secret, 114 and these agreements are longer-lasting than

109

See Hutter, supra note 58, at 315–16; Stone, supra note 59, at 738. In addition, “the nature
of the employment relationship [generally] imposes an implied duty on agents and employees to
protect the employer’s trade secrets and other confidential information, which has often been held to
survive the termination of the employment relationship.” LORD, supra note 58, §§ 54:31–54:32
(citations omitted). Of course, the better practice is to express the duty in writing in a confidentiality
agreement.
110
Hutter, supra note 58, at 315–16; Blake, supra note 58, at 669; Stone, supra note 59, at
738; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “nondisclosure agreement” as “[a]
contract or contractual provision containing a person’s promise not to disclose any information
shared by or discovered from a trade-secret holder, including all information about trade secrets,
procedures, or other internal matters.”).
111
See Wetzel, supra note 71, at 65–66 (citations omitted) (“If an employee has been in a
position to learn his employer’s trade secrets, a covenant not to compete provides greater assurance
that such secrets will not be disclosed than does a mere covenant not to disclose, which may be
difficult to enforce.”); Blake, supra note 58, at 690 (stating that “that there [may] be no practical way
to police whether or not a former employee is violating the covenant”).
112
Blake, supra note 58, at 669.
113
Id. (“[T]he important thing to the employer is not having a cause of action in case of a
breach of confidence, but preventing the violation from occurring. An injunction not to disclose can
seldom undo or effectively prevent the doing of the real damage.”).
114
See Barrick, supra note 72, at 77 (quoting R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 3.02(1)(d)
(1967) (“Since it is infrequently difficult to determine whether a certain class of information
qualifies as a trade secret, it appears desirable to protect by contract classes of information and data
that, individually or collectively, might constitute a trade secret. A court need not determine that
such information or data is a trade secret, but rather only that the covenant to protect it was
reasonable.’”)).
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noncompetition agreements because they typically are enforceable as
long as the information remains confidential. 115
Third, an employer can use a nonsolicitation agreement to protect
its customer relations. This type of agreement is a covenant by an
individual to not solicit his or her former employer’s clientele after
termination of employment. 116 In the case of the charitable nonprofit,
the key “clients” are the donors; the individuals who actually utilize the
organization’s services are not as likely to follow a departed employee
because they may be utilizing the organization’s services out of necessity
rather than loyalty to a particular employee. While an employer risks
souring its existing client relationships by enforcing nonsolicitation
agreements, 117 these agreements—like nondisclosure agreements—are
much more narrowly-tailored to the employer’s legitimate business
interests and are less onerous than noncompetition agreements. 118
Finally, rather than requiring an employee to sign an agreement that
prohibits certain behavior upon termination, an employer can provide the
employee with incentives to remain with the organization (i.e., offer a
carrot rather than wield a stick). In this vein, charitable nonprofits could
offer a form of tenure to those employees who have become deeply
involved with the company such that they have access to its confidential
information or have formed meaningful relationships with donors. 119
Tenure confers a permanent or secure status on an employee by allowing
for termination only in rare or extenuating circumstances, such as
financial exigency, professional incompetence, illegal activity, or sexual
harassment. 120 While tenure sometimes is criticized for removing
115

See Blake, supra note 58, at 689–90; see also LORD, supra note 58, § 54:33.
See Blake, supra note 58, at 653–54, 690; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining “nonsolicitation agreement” as “[a] promise, [usually] in . . . an employment contract to
refrain, for a specified time, from either (1) enticing employees to leave the company or (2) trying to
lure customers away”). Professor Blake describes nonsolicitation agreements as “a narrow form” of
noncompetition agreements. Blake, supra note 58, at 657 n.89.
117
Blake, supra note 58, at 657 (“[T]he former employer is not likely to maintain happy
relations with a customer who learns that a court order has been obtained which prevents him from
receiving an offer from an old business friend.”).
118
See Estlund, supra note 98, at 425 (stating that nonsolicitation agreements “impose lower
costs on the employee and the public” than noncompetition agreements).
119
Another type of incentive is the use of “golden handcuffs,” which means the employer
pays an employee to continue working at the organization. Lester, supra note 58, at 51–52.
However, “it would be necessary to pay the employee enough to make him indifferent between
exploiting the information elsewhere and staying,” which may be exorbitant. Id. at 52. Moreover,
golden handcuffs often come in the form of stock options, see id., which charitable nonprofits do not
use.
120
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1509 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “tenure” as “the legal
protection of a long-term relationship, such as employment” and as “[a] status afforded to a teacher
or professor as a protection against summary dismissal without sufficient cause”); see also id.
116
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incentives for productivity, 121 it rewards employee loyalty and also
results in a more stable workforce for the employer—in other words,
both parties benefit. 122 As an added bonus, utilization of a tenure system
may entice employees who are deciding between a for-profit entity and
its charitable nonprofit counterpart to choose the latter. 123
Many institutions in the education sector, which makes up a large
subsection of the charitable nonprofit sector, 124 award tenure to faculty

(defining “tenured faculty” as “[t]he members of a school’s teaching staff who hold their positions
for life or until retirement, and who may not be discharged except for cause”); See Mark L. Adams,
The Quest for Tenure: Job Security and Academic Freedom, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 74–75 (2006);
James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Employment Relationship Save
All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159, 200 (2000).
121
See Adams, supra note 120, at 71; see also Fishman, supra note 120, at 170–72
(discussing several criticisms of tenure).
122
See Adams, supra note 120, at 91 (discussing how tenure contributes to stability in the
university context); Fishman, supra note 120, at 179–80 (discussing the benefits of academic
tenure).
123
See Adams, supra note 120, at 70 (“Tenure provides an important protection through the
benefit of job security that offsets the salary differences between those who choose an academic, as
opposed to a professional or business, career.”); Fishman, supra note 120, at 181–82 (“Colleges and
universities historically have not had the financial resources to pay faculty at rates competitive with
private industry or the marketplace. In real terms, professorial and public service salaries have risen
little in the post-war period, while the incomes of professionals and business people have shown
large gains. One way to overcome the economic inequalities is through non-salaried benefits such as
tenure.”); Robert W. McGee and Walter E. Block, Academic Tenure: An Economic Critique, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 545, 546–47 (1991) (“Because most people are risk-averse, they would
choose the position that included a guaranteed job for life, other things being equal. Therefore, the
possession of tenure has some value. That being the case, professors who have tenure, or who are
hired with the possibility of receiving tenure, will work for less money than professors who cannot
hope to receive a guarantee of lifetime employment.”).
124
Two dominant subsections of the charitable nonprofit sector are healthcare and education.
See Boris & Steuerle, supra note 3, at 72–80 (discussing the statistics related to reporting public
charities and demonstrating that higher education and hospitals are dominant in terms of finances
and employment); Leete, supra note 30, at 160, 160 tbl.7.2 (“In 2001, 41.9 percent of nonprofit
employment was devoted to health services, 21.9 percent to education or research organizations,
11.8 percent to religious organizations (including congregations), 18.3 percent to legal and social
services, with the remainder in foundations, arts and culture, and civic, fraternal, and social
organizations.”); SOI Tax Stats - Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07eocharitiessnap.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014) [hereinafter
Statistics of Income] (stating that, for the 2007 tax year, “large hospitals and universities dominated
the financial activity of the nonprofit charitable sector”). In 2000, charitable nonprofits in the
healthcare industry had revenues of approximately $450.7 billion, while those in the education
industry earned $166.2 billion. Boris & Steuerle, supra note 3, at fig.3.6 (citing The Urban Institute,
NCCS/GuideStar National Nonprofit Database (2000)). In 2004, nonprofit health services
organizations accounted for 59% of total nonprofit spending, while nonprofit educational entities
accounted for 17%. Hines Jr. et al., supra note 1, at 1185 (citing Paul Arnsberger, Charities, Social
Welfare, and Other Tax-exempt Organizations, 2004, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2007, at 210, 213).
In 2008, “nine of the ten largest organizations (measured by assets) were hospitals or universityaffiliated organizations.” Statistics of Income, supra. During that tax year, health-related
organizations ranked first in the charitable nonprofit sector in terms of revenue, with a reported
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members who have contributed to the school positively through
scholarship, teaching, and service. 125 This system, in part, allows the
universities to protect their investment in their employees as well as their
relationships with donors. To illustrate, consider this cycle of activity:
Universities invest money into their faculty members’ research and
scholarship, through which the faculty members come to be known as
experts in their particular field and the university gains recognition.
When the university gains recognition, it is likely to draw more donor
support, and many faculty members form relationships with the donors.
Accordingly, the tenure system allows universities to retain employees
who—if they were to leave—might take with them not only their
reputation, but possibly also some donors. A similar system could work
effectively in other charitable nonprofit organizations, as well. 126 Thus,
several equally—and in some instances, more—effective alternatives to
the traditional noncompetition agreement exist.
B.

THE PROPOSAL: CONGRESS SHOULD RENDER NONCOMPETITION
AGREEMENTS UNENFORCEABLE WHEN USED TO PREVENT
EMPLOYEE MOBILITY BETWEEN CHARITABLE NONPROFITS

Because noncompetition agreements are at odds with the nature of
the charitable nonprofit organization, and in light of the multitude of

$803.9 billion, while education-related organizations ranked second with $240.3 billion in revenue.
See Arnsberger & Graham, supra note 3, at 4–5 & fig.E (reporting statistics based on a sample of
returns filed with the IRS by § 501(c)(3) organizations for the 2008 tax year). Neither the health nor
education subsector receives significant amounts of private donations. See Boris & Steuerle, supra
note 3, at 77 & figs.3.6, 3.7 (“[H]igher education and hospitals . . . differ from the rest of nonprofits
in their limited reliance on private contributions.”); Brown & Slivinski, supra note 28, at 143 (citing
B. Weisbrod, Private Goods, Collective Goods: The Role of the Nonprofit Sector, in K. Clarkson &
D. Martin, eds., THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROPRIETARY ORGANIZATIONS RESEARCH IN LAW AND
ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT 1 (1980)) (“[Private donations] tend to represent a greater fraction of
revenues for nonprofit organizations providing collective consumption of goods, for which it is
difficult to charge consumers, than for nonprofits such as universities and hospitals that provide
goods with a significant component of private consumption.”). However, they do rely on money
from the government. For example, over three-quarters of the health subsector’s revenues in 2000
were from Medicare and Medicaid. See Boris & Steuerle, supra note 3, at 74–75 & 76 fig.3.6 (citing
The Urban Institute, NCCS/GuideStar National Nonprofit Database (2000)).
125
See Number and Percent of Faculty, Average Salary, Average Compensation, Average
Benefits, and Percent of Faculty Tenured,by Category and Academic Rank, 2011–12, AAUP.ORG,
www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/B920A441-FE70-4B7D-B3B2-99DE5CC02F9C/0/Tab13.pdf
(last
visited May 3, 2014) (showing that 54.5% of faculty members at ranked academic institutions are
tenured as of 2011–12); Adams, supra note 120, at 81 (stating that “the tenure decision is based
principally on the candidate’s record of teaching, scholarship, and service”).
126
The tenure-like system would, of course, need to be adapted to the specific industry in
which the charitable nonprofit is engaged, taking into account professional obligations and
expectations.
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alternative forms of protection available to those institutions,
noncompetition agreements should be considered unenforceable when
used to prevent individuals from leaving one charitable nonprofit to work
for another. There are two main avenues through which this goal could
be accomplished: state legislatures could amend the statutes currently
governing noncompetition agreements, or Congress could issue a federal
mandate. 127 While the first option maintains continuity with the current
legal framework, the second option—a federal statute—would be the
most efficient choice and would provide the highest level of uniformity
in the law.
As discussed above, the validity of employee noncompetition
agreements is governed primarily by state statute. 128 Thus, incorporating
a provision that renders unenforceable specific types of noncompetition
agreements would fit seamlessly into the current system. However,
states’ legislative processes can take years and would require the
mobilization of lobbyists and supporters in each state to put the process
in action. 129 Moreover, even assuming a similar bill was introduced and
supported in each state (in actuality, it is likely that the language would
not be uniform), the various states’ legislative processes move at
different speeds and would produce results at varying times. 130 This

127

See Robert C. Hayden, Non-competition Issues for Multistate Employers, EMP. REL. L.J.
52, 58 (Summer 2004) (discussing the possible solutions for changing the laws governing the
enforceability of employee noncompetition agreements). Congress’s authority to implement such a
law stems from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce. Loren W. Brown, Credit Report: An Acceptable Aid to the Hiring
Decision?, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2011); Timothy J. Coley, Getting Noticed: Direct and
Indirect Power-Allocation in the Contemporary American Labor Market, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 965,
989 (2010); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
128
See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
129
See Hayden, supra note 126, at 58–59 (describing “state-by-state change in the law” as “a
glacial process”). For example, a brief overview of the legislative process in Minnesota (the
Author’s home state) is as follows: an individual or organization proposes a law and finds a
legislator to sponsor the law, the legislative staff translates the idea into proper form, the proposed
law (now a “bill”) is introduced to the House and Senate and referred to one or more committees, the
committee members discuss the bill and invite public comment, the committees vote on the bill, bills
that are approved by the committees move to the full bodies for a vote, and, finally, bills that pass
both the House and the Senate go to the governor for approval. See Minnesota House of
Representatives Public Information Services, State Law Process, MINNESOTA STATE GOVERNMENT
SERIES, 1, 1-3 (Jun. 26, 2013), www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hinfo/govser/GOVSER6.pdf. Bills that
do not complete the process in the course of one legislative session can be held over to the next year.
See id. at 4.
130
Even use of a uniform or model act, such as those drafted by the Uniform Law
Commission, would not produce significantly different results in this instance. Those acts are “years
in the making” and must be approved by at least twenty states before they can be considered for
adoption by state legislatures.
ULC Drafting Process, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
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would compound the frustration already felt by multi-state employers
who must deal with the current state of non-uniformity among the
jurisdictions in which they do business. 131
The more prudent course of action would be for Congress to speak
out. Use of a federal law would ensure uniformity and eliminate the
confusion that currently surrounds the various state laws, thereby putting
all charitable nonprofits on an even playing field regarding this issue.
Moreover, the process for enacting the law would be comparatively
easy, 132 as would enforcement—to the extent the federal law conflicted
with a state’s law governing noncompetition agreements, the federal law
would control. 133

www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=ULC Drafting Process (last visited April 15, 2013).
And, while uniform acts are to be adopted “exactly as written,” model acts are merely guidelines
“which states can borrow from or adapt to suit their individual needs and conditions.” Id. Thus,
lack of uniformity in the law still could be an issue.
131
See Hayden, supra note 126, at 58 (“The differing approaches to non-competition
agreements among the states results in an uneven playing field that will often give a significant
unfair advantage to competitors that have substantial operations in states friendly to non-competition
agreements, while significantly disabling competitors with the bulk of their operations in states
hostile to such agreements.”); Hutter, supra note 58, at 343 (“It is a valid possibility that an
employee non-competition agreement which is enforceable in one state may nevertheless be ruled
void in another state and in still a third state be modified to be reasonable and then enforced.”);
Bishara, supra note 68, at 289 (“[E]ach state has its own laws concerning covenants not to compete,
which can cause problems for employers and employees who have business locations across the
country.”).
132
See Hayden, supra note 127, at 59 (“Federalizing the non-competition laws, on the other
hand, requires just one set of laws to be passed by just two bodies—the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Of course the members of both the House and the Senate represent the states and
localities in which they are elected, but they also have an obligation to look at issues from a national,
as opposed to state or local, view. Therefore, they may be far less resistant to the idea of change.”).
133
This proposition is based on the notion of federal preemption found in the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the “Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized three types of preemption under which state law may be displaced by federal statute:
express preemption, implied field preemption, and implied conflict preemption. See, e.g., Susan
Crile, Comment, A Minor Conflict: Why the Objectives of Federal Sex Trafficking Legislation
Preempt the Enforcement of State Prostitution Laws Against Minors, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1783, 1798–
99 (2012) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990); Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226
(2000). “‘Express’ preemption occurs when a federal statute includes a preemption clause explicitly
withdrawing specified powers from the states.” Nelson, supra, at 226. Implied field preemption
occurs when a federal regulatory scheme is “‘so pervasive’ that there is ‘no room’ for state law.”
Crile, supra, at 1799 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956)). And, implied
conflict preemption “occurs when state and federal legislation are in conflict, either because
compliance with both laws is impossible or because the state law frustrates the federal law’s
purposes.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, “to the extent a federal [law] governs an activity, there can
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The main issue with this approach is where the provision should be
located. While Congress has enacted many laws related to the employeremployee relationship, governing everything from minimum wage
requirements to an employee’s right to join a union, none of those
statutes seems like the right place for a provision relating to the
enforceability of noncompetition agreements issued by charitable
nonprofits. 134 Rather, the premise of this Article—that enforceability of
these agreements should turn on the nature of the employer—suggests
the proper place for the provision is within the portion of the federal tax
code that grants charitable nonprofits their tax-exempt status. Thus, in
addition to enumerating in subsection (c) of 26 U.S.C. § 501 the
conditions necessary for attaining charitable nonprofit status (and the
attendant tax benefits), Congress should include a new subsection (t) as
follows:
(t) Restriction on use of noncompetition agreements. An organization
which is described in subsection (c)(3), and which is exempt from
taxation under subsection (a), shall not use a noncompetition
agreement to prevent a former employee from engaging in
employment for any other organization which is described in
subsection (c)(3) and which is exempt from taxation under subsection
(a).
Noncompetition agreements used in such a manner are
unenforceable per se. 135

This location will help to ensure that there is no confusion as to which
entities are affected by the provision, and—most importantly—this
location is most directly tied to the reasons for enacting the provision in
the first place—i.e., ensuring charitable nonprofits are acting in

be no contrary state or local law. Nevertheless, federal and state laws concerning the same basic
interest can coexist so long as the state laws are not in any serious manner contradictory.” Brown,
supra note 126, at 15–16.
134
See Hayden, supra note 127, at 59 (stating that there is “plenty of precedent for
federalization in the employment context,” including the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Coley, supra note 126, at 990
(“Through its Commerce Clause powers, Congress has implemented a variety of federal legislative
initiatives that fall under the broad umbrella of labor and employment policy; these include . . . free
trade agreements, . . . mandated minimum wage and improved workplace conditions, family and
medical leave, . . . and a host of anti-discrimination laws.”) (citations omitted); see also Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012) (governing minimum wage requirements); National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012) (governing collective bargaining).
135
This language should serve to preempt contrary state law through implied conflict
preemption. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. However, to eliminate any confusion,
Congress could choose to expressly preempt inconsistent state law by adding the following language
to the end of the proposed subsection (t): “This provision preempts any State or local law insofar as
the State or local law permits the use of noncompetition agreements as prohibited herein.”
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accordance with their missions. Without a law like this in place,
charitable nonprofits will be able to continue enjoying the best of both
the for-profit and nonprofit worlds.
CONCLUSION
“[T]he business of contributing to the public good . . . [is] arguably
the primary principle that motivates the nonprofit enterprise,” 136 thereby
greatly differentiating such entities from their for-profit counterparts.
That is especially true in the case of the charitable nonprofit. In return,
charitable nonprofits receive billions of dollars worth of tax exemptions
from the government and donations from individuals that allow them to
stay in business while pursuing their altruistic missions. Thus, charitable
nonprofit organizations operate in a non-traditional competitive
environment that rewards good deeds, albeit at a “considerable social
cost.” 137
Despite their unique situation and the benefits already bestowed
upon them, charitable nonprofits have the ability to use noncompetition
agreements to their advantage in the marketplace. Noncompetition
agreements, which prevent employees from leaving one entity to work
for another in a similar capacity for a certain period of time after
termination of employment, are borne out of a desire to maximize profits
and prevent competition in a traditional competitive environment. They
should not be used in the non-traditional competitive environment
inhabited by charitable nonprofits. Rather, allowing one charitable
nonprofit to prevent a former employee from working for another
charitable nonprofit is contrary to the charitable nonprofit’s mission and
tax-exempt status. Moreover, alternative and less intrusive means of
protecting an employer’s interests exist. Thus, Congress should enact a
law rendering noncompetition agreements unenforceable to the extent
they are used to prevent employee mobility between charitable nonprofit
organizations.

136
137

Minkoff & Powell, supra note 27, at 591.
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 8, at 7.
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